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For e sufficiently large obviously the core will be nonempty. When /z is
centered, Theorem 2 says the core will become non-empty (w.p.l) as the
population increases, for any positive e, however small.
Theorem 2. Let fi be a centered distribution on $Rm satisfying one of the
regularity conditions (i-iii). Let a population of n ideal points with Euclidean
preferences be sampled independently from [i. Then in Models I and II, for
any e > 0, there is equilibrium with respect to simple majority rule as n —
*
oo w.p.l.
Proof. While the actual proof of Theorem 2 is relegated to the appendix, the
intuitive ideas can be seen quite easily in two dimensions.




gion defined by the hyperbola shown is where y will draw support against an
incumbent at the distribution center z. For any particular y, centeredness
implies that the probability measure of the associated hyperboloid region is
less than 1/2. Then by the law of large numbers, incumbent z will defeat c
with probability 1 as the population increases. To prove that all alternatives
are simultaneously defeated, we employ real analysis to control the probabil-
ity measures of all the hyperboloid regions with a single bound, and invoke
strong results on uniform convergence of empirical measures to be sure this
bound is adhered to closely enough in all the regions.
In the remainder of this section we will show that in the context of Model
I, the e-core has a strong foundation in economic and human behavior.
4.1.1 The cost of change
A very natural way to justify assumption I is to view e as the cost of change.2
There can be very strong economic reasons for resisting change. For
example, when the U.S. Congress overhauled the tax law in 1986, the Wall
Street Journal reported an estimate of 100 billion dollars as the cost to Amer-
ican business for compliance, simply to meet the new legal, accounting, and
reporting requirements. Thus a change could easily decrease a company's
"this observation, including the consequent conflict between empirical data and the
simple static form of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, is due to James
McConnell.
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tax liability, yet result in a net loss due to legal, administrative, and data
processing costs. In general the cost of altering business plans is enormous.
Start-up costs are a major part of business planning for product cycles.
Individuals resist change in many situations. Illustrations of this phe-
nomenon are found in many fields. In marketing science, brand loyalty is a
broadly accepted and observed behavior. In political science, party loyalty
has been long observed and well documented. Some interesting examples of
resistance to change are found in experiments from the study of cognitive
dissonance, initiated by Leon Festinger [21]. Festinger found that people
with a belief position would reject data in conflict with their beliefs, rather
than change their beliefs. Other illustrations are found in experiments ini-
tiated by B.F. Skinner on response cost. Evidence from neurophysiology
indicate a physical basis for these observations: there are measurable physi-
ological changes in the brain that accompany learning or changes to memory
[32, 31, 33, 8]. Thus if only by thermodynamic principles, changes cannot be
effected without some cost.
The decision-making associated with Model I can be viewed as rational
behavior. Consider a utility function U[p] mapping alternatives p £ $tm to
utility values. In the presence of a cost of change, this simple functional form
is inadequate to capture decision-making behavior. A more sophisticated
form is needed; e.g. let U\pi,p2] denote the utility of being at position p, in
period i, i = 1,2. Then we could have U[a
:
a] > U[a,b] and U[b,b] > U[b,a\.
Thus whichever of a, b is the present position will be the preferred position
for the next period. These preferences would appear reflexive with the less
sophisticated functional form3 .
4.1.2 Bounded rationality
The concept of bounded rationality [54] offers another possible justification
of Model I. This idea is based on the fact that people have limited or costly
computational abilities or resources. Bounded rationality is modelled by as-
suming computations are limited to those that can be realized on a particular
formal model of computation. For example, we may assume (as in [39]) that
each voter's computations are performed on a DFA (deterministic finite au-
tomaton, see [29] for an exposition) with at most M states. The bound M
'This form was suggested by Stan Zin and Victor Rios-Rull.
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jority over the center would lie in a very small area, if voters were uniformly
distributed in a rectangle. He adds, "at this point, however, most voters will
feel that new proposals are splitting hairs, and the motion to adjourn will
carry." [pages 260-261]. Note that the uniform distribution on a rectangle is
centered. Therefore, as promised, one consequence of Theorem 2 is a math-
ematically rigorous justification of Tullock's "general irrelevance" argument.
Tullock's suggestion is not that participants will be unable to distinguish, but
that they will not tolerate arbitrarily fine distinctions or "hairsplitting". It
seems likely that this assumed limitation of hairsplitting will apply in many
situations, simply as a consequence of human behavior.
Model II is also applicable in situations where the institution explicitly
constrains new alternatives to be some minimal distance from the incumbent
proposal. In this context Model II represents one of the standard institutional
methods of restoring stability. Theorem 2 could therefore be employed as the-
oretical support for this institutional restriction. Theorem 3 and Model IV,
to follow, could be invoked to support another standard institutional restric-
tion (supermajority). This aspect of the results is not emphasized because
(in the author's opinion) the institutional approach has a more normative fla-
vor than the work here, where the goal is for stability to follow from natural,
plausible, widely applicable assumptions (rather than from easily enforced
rules).
4.3 Models III &: IV: incumbency advantages
The incumbent may enjoy particular advantages in attracting voters, espe-
cially in political situations where the incumbent is a person. In the United
States, incumbents generally have more visibility and campaign funding than
challengers. In many corporate elections the incumbent officers control the
proxy votes of inactive small shareholders. In general, there are apt to be
interests vested in the status quo, whether the status quo is a person, policy,
resource allocation, or law.
Models III and IV are intended to capture the "clout" or other advantage
the incumbent may possess. Model III states that the incumbent has an
advantage in drawing out supporters.
Model III: Supporters of the incumbent abstain with probability 1 — p > 0;
supporters of any challenger abstain with probability 1 — q > 1 — p.
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Model IV gives the incumbent a bloc of fi(n) voters who will vote for
incumbent. These might be, for example, uninformed voters who decide on
the basis of name recognition, or proxy voters controlled by the incumbent
corporate board.
Model IV: A subset 5, |5| ~ fi(n) of voters will vote for the incumbent
regardless of their true preferences.
The key feature of Models III and IV is that the incumbency exerts an
influence proportional to the population size. The "e" in these models is the
proportionality factor: (p — q) in Model III; the t such that \S\ > en in Model
IV. Suppose, for example, 5% of the voting population were uninformed and
voted solely on the basis of name recognition, and that a larger fraction of
these recognized the incumbent than the challenger. The differential fraction
would form a bloc as in Model IV. Theorem 3, following, would imply that
an incumbent at the center of the distribution \i would be undefeatable.
Theorem 3. Let \x be a centered distribution. Let a population of n ideal
points be sampled independently from fi. Then in Model III or IV, there is
equilibrium as n —> oo w.p.l.
Proof: Intuitively, nearly 1/2 of the voters will be sure to prefer to the
challenger, for large populations. Either modification gives the incumbent a
slight additional advantage, which is enough to assure at least half the votes.
For a rigorous proof, see the Appendix. (For this proof to apply, the influence
need only be more than of order ~ ^/n, but this seems to hold only technical
interest).
4.4 Discretization: Models V & VI
The last two models we consider involve discretization, that is, limiting the
possible values of a variable to a certain discrete set. For example, a compu-
tation of present value might be computed in whole dollars.
Model V: Discretized Utilities For some u > 0, individual decisions are
consistent with calculations of utility functions in integer multiples of u
.
Or, instead of utilities, the set of potential proposals could be discrete.
For example, the U.S. president and Congress may have long debates over
income tax rates, but all proposals are in whole percents for tax rates and
17
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Abstract
Democratic simple majority voting is perhaps the most widely
used method of group decision making in our time. Current theory,
based on "instability"'1 theorems, predicts that a group employing this
method will almost always fail to reach a stable conclusion. There is
one case that the classical instability theorems do not treat: an even
number of voters in 2 dimensions. We resolve this remaining case,
proving that instability occurs with probability converging rapidly to
1 as the population increases.
But empirical observations do not support the gloomy predictions
of the instability theorems. We show that the instability theorems
are themselves unstable in the following sense: if the model of voter
behavior is altered however slightly to incorporate any of several plau-
sible characteristics of decision-making, then the instability theorems
do not hold and in fact the probability of stability converges to 1 as
the population increases, when the population is sampled from a cen-
tered distribution. The assumptions considered are: a cost of change;
bounded rationality; perceptual thresholds: a cost of uncertainty; a
discrete proposal space, and others. One consequence of this work
is to render precise and rigorous, the solution proposed by Tullock
[63. 64] and refined by Arrow [2] to the impossibility problem. The
stability results all hold for arbitrary dimension, and generalize to
establish a tradeoff between the characteristics and the degree of non-
centeredness of a population. As a by-product of the analysis, we
establish the statistical consistency of the sample yolk radius.
1 Introduction
A principal goal of political economy has been to understand and explain
the contemporary processes by which group decisions are made. In present
times, democracy based on simple majority rule has emerged as perhaps the
predominant mode of group decision making. Current theory predicts the
failure of a majority-rule democracy. Indeed, the classical results on social
choice are predominantly pessimistic: the counterintuitive voter paradox of
Condorcet, the extraordinary impossibility theorem of Arrow, the classic
instability theorems of McKelvey, Rubenstein, Schofield, and others.
However, instability is not characteristically observed empirically, though




to bridge the gap between the theory and observation of the democratic
decision-making process.
The key idea is to enrich the social choice model by incorporating char-
acteristics of decision-making behavior. For example, one characteristic we
posit is a cost of change: e.g., the cost of proposed production levels may
depend in part on present production levels. In many situations the assump-
tion of a cost of change is justified by direct economic considerations; in other
situations this assumption may be supported by evidence from various fields
including marketing science, operations research, experimental pyschology,
and political science. We explore the implications, on the societal level, of
this behavior on the individual level.
Our starting point is the Downsian or spatial model of voting [14, 4, 12, 10]
under Euclidean or quadratic concave preferences. This is at present the
most widely used model of group choice and has found extensive empirical
application as well [44, 43, 42, 1, e.g.]. Current theory, in the form of the
classic instability theorems [40, 36, 50, 35, 37], states that instability will
occur, leading to chaotic movement and cycling. There is an unresolved case
in the literature: 2 dimensions with an even number of voters. Before getting
to the main point of the paper, we complete the pessimistic instability results,
showing the following (Theorem 1 and Corollary 1): if 2n voter ideal points
are drawn independently from any nonsingular distribution in 2 dimensions,
then almost surely there is no stability as n —> oc. A stronger result is not
possible since Schofield has shown stability occurs wit! positive probability
for all n [51]. Convergence here is quite rapid: when n = 11 the probability
is less than 1%. Note: except for the result just cited, all results in this paper
hold for arbitrary dimension m > 2.
Continuing to the main point (section 3), we make an additional assump-
tion regarding the distribution of voter ideal points: the population is drawn
according to a centered distribution which is continuous or has bounded sup-
port. In section 5 we will show how this assumption may be relaxed. For
now we note that most distributions in the literature are centered, e.g. the
multivariate normal, uniform cube, ball, parallelopiped, or ellipsoid. In ad-
dition the U.S. Senate data in [27] appears consistent with a centeredness
assumption.
We then develop several modifications to the standard Downsian model,
each based upon a plausible assumption about decision-making. It turns out
that that just the slightest alteration to the basic model, by injection of the
least bit of any of these assumptions, nullifies the instability theorems. More
precisely, the probability of stability will converge to 1 as the population
grows.
The first modification (Model I , section 4.1) assumes that there exists
t > 0, such that a voter will prefer a new alternative to the status quo only
if the former is at least t better than the latter. This assumption is justified
in many situations where there exists some minimal (threshold) nonzero cost
e > of change. Often this is a direct economic cost; we will argue that
in many other situations the cost of change may be nonzero because of the
cost of the greater uncertainty of the new alternative, or for other indirect
reasons. Thus Model I applies to a broad variety of situations. Theorem 2
proves that in Model I, however small e, stability ensues in any dimension
with probability 1 as the population increases. This modification is analogous
to the notion of an e-core [66, 53] (or quasi-core [52]) in game theory, and to
the concept of an e-equilibrium, and in these terms Theorem 2 guarantees
(probabilistically) the existence of an e-core for all positive e.
The concept of bounded rationality [54] provides an alternative justifi-
cation for the e > assumption of Model I (section 4.1.2). If the voters
have only the computational power of a finite automaton, then they will not
be able to recognize arbitrarily small differences in distance (utility). Thus
Model I applies, and stability ensues with probability 1 as the population in-
creases. This result mirrors results in game theory, where more cooperative
group behavior emerges under the same assumption [39]. We also extend this
result to the case where computational power is limited by the more powerful
class of pushdown automata. When this justification of Model I is invoked,
we have the intriguing outcome, that individual imperfections or limitations
may contribute to social stability.
Model II (section 4.2) assumes that for some t > no alternative at
distance less than e from the incumbent or status quo may be introduced.
As with Model I we argue that this assumption is valid in a great many
situations. For example, people often are limited by perceptual thresholds,
and are unable to distinguish between arbitrarily close alternatives. This
assumption is also consistent with the idea of "institutional" restrictions.
When this assumption is valid, Theorem 2 again provides a positive outcome
(theorem 2): stability with probability 1, in any dimension, as the population
grows.
Model II also serves as a precise formulation of Tullock's controversial pro-
posed solution to the instability problem [63, 64]. Two and a half decades
ago, Tullock, concerned with the gap between theory and observation, had
sought to explain the "irrelevance" of the Arrow impossibility theorem via
the 2-dimensional Downsian model. Assuming a uniform rectangular distri-
bution, and a prohibition against "hairsplitting", Tullock argued informally
that stability would ensue. Succeeding work by Arrow [2], McKelvey[36, 35],
and others [11, e.g.] appeared first to prove, then to disprove, Tullock's in-
genious argument. However, Tullock's argument has never been proved nor
disproved [60]. We prove it here in Theorem 2, and extend it to arbitrary
dimension.
The third and fourth models we consider assume some kind of a priori
advantage on the part of the incumbent or status quo. Again we argue
that this assumption is frequently valid, whether due to the control of proxy
votes by the incumbent board at the stockholder's meeting, greater name
recognition of political incumbents, or interests vested in the status quo.
Theorem 3 (section 5) guarantees that in Models III and IV, stability will
exist with probability 1 as the population increases. The result confirms work
of Sloss[56] and Slut sky [5 7], who find that if a proposal is a priori guaranteed
a number of votes, it is easier for it to be a stable point ("easier" here means
that the conditions for stability are mathematically weaker, though they are
much more complex [26, 3]). Also related is work by Feld and Grofman [18],
who study cases in two dimensions with 3 and 5 voters, and observe that
incumbency advantage makes stability more likely. Theorem 3 provides a
precise and rigorous generalization of their observation.
The last two models we consider are based on discretization assumptions.
Model V assumes that the distance or utility function calculations are not
performed over a continuum, but rather over a discrete set of possible values.
This assumption would be valid for instance, if numerical calculations were
performed in fixed precision, or if costs were computed only to the nearest
cent (or centime). Model VI assumes that the proposal space is a discrete
set. These models are similar but not identical to models I and II, respec-
tively. The outcome is identical: Theorem 4 tells us that stability exists with
probability 1 as the population increases.
Thus the instability theorems are themselves unstable with respect to
slight realistic modifications to the basic spatial model. This may help ex-
plain why majority rule usually works in practice.
The reinstatement of stability is in the same spirit as in [46], where models
of auction participant behavior are enriched to improve consistency between
the predicted and actual outcomes of auctions for U.S. Forest Service timber
(see also [47, 45, 24]).
While the centeredness of underlying distributions remains an open ques-
tion, we feel it is doubtful that real populations or groups behave as though
sampled from a perfectly centered distribution (although there is some em-
pirical evidence that the underlying distribution may not be very much off-
centered). The e-stability Theorems 2-4 just described make the strong as-
sumption that the distribution is centered. On the other hand, these theo-
rems make the relatively weak assumption that c > 0. It seems likely that
in many of the situations discussed, e will not just be nonzero, but will have
non-negligible magnitude. For example, the cost of change or of uncertainty
can be substantial in many cases. This suggests that we seek a trade-off
between the centeredness of the distribution and the magnitude of e.
The yolk radius and the Simpson- Cramer min-max majority are two mea-
sures of non-centeredness. We show (section 5) how a tradeoff between the
degree of centeredness and the value of c in Models I-IV leads to stability.
When e is greater than the distributional yolk radius, in model I, stability en-
sues with probability 1 as the population grows (Theorem 6). Similar results
hold for the other models.
The goals of this paper are primarily analytical and empirical, rather
than normative (though some of the results could be applied toward that
end). We discuss in a companion paper [60] the importance of establishing
the statistical consistency of sample estimators, as part of the methodolog-
ical underpinnings of empirical study of social choice. As a by-product of
the analysis here, we obtain (Corollary 6.2) the asymptotic statistical consis-
tency of the sample yolk radius, though under somewhat stronger regularity
assumptions than we should like.
Ultimately we should like a model of social choice with good explanatory
and effective predictive power. Thus we seek stronger tests of our proposed
explanation, than that they should merely predict stability. In the case of
Model I, there is some very promising corroborative experimental work re-
ported by Salant and Goodstein [49], who formulated Model I independently
and prior to the work reported here. These tests and other empirical issues
are discussed in section 6. In Section 7 the results are extended to the class
of intermediate preferences and some related work is discussed.
2 Instability in Two Dimensions
We begin by filling in the last portion of the gloomy picture painted by
the instability theorems. The work of Plott, McKelvey, Rubenstein, and
Schofield cited earlier has shown that the probability of equilibrium is in
three or more dimensions, and in two dimensions when the number of voters is
odd. To be more precise, the set of configurations for which equilibrium exists
is measure for these cases. The case of 2 dimensions with an even number
of voters has never been resolved. All that is known is that the probability of
equilbrium is positive (the set of configurations for which equilibrium exists
has positive measure) [51]. In this section we show that the probability
of equilibrium converges to in this case. This will complete the gloomy
instability results for all dimensions > 1.
In the Euclidean spatial model of voting, voter ideal points are located
in 5Rm and voters prefer policies (points) closer to their ideal points under
the Euclidean norm. This model is equivalent to the more general case of
convex quadratic preferences, (see [11]), and usually extends to the even more
general class of "intermediate preferences'1 [23] (see Section 7).
Theorem 1. Let fi be any totally nondegenerate probability distribution on
9?
2
. Let 2m voter ideal points be sampled independently at random according
to fi. The probability the resulting configuration possesses a majority rule
equilibrium is less than
2e\/2^m 3/2 e- rn = {2m) 3/2^e 1 - Tn (1)
Corollary 1. LInder the assumptions of Theorem 1, as m —> oo, majority
rule equilibrium does not occur a.e..
Proof. Since / is nondegenerate, with probability 1 no three points are
collinear. Similarly, with probability 1 no three lines formed by pairs of
points intersect at a point. Therefore with probability 1, if there is a core
point it occurs at a voter ideal point. Let vl5 . . . , v2m denote the ideal points.
Henceforth we assume the probability degenerate events do not occur.
We bound the probability that v^ is a majority rule equilibrium point.
Imagine a line in the plane passing through V\. See Figure 1. Pin the line
at vi and color the two rays emanating from V\ black and white. Keeping
the line pinned at v
x
spin the line around 180 degrees. As the line spins, it
crosses over the other v
,
in the plane. The only way for Vi to be undominated
is if the white and black crossings are perfectly interleaved. Without loss of
generality assume the first crossing is white. Conditioning on the locations
of all the white crossings, and on there being exactly m white crossings and
m — 1 black crossings (an obvious necessary condition for equilibrium at
t'i), we find the half-plane defined by the line, where the black crossings
will occur, to be divided into sectors. (See Figure 1). These sectors are
defined by the white crossings, which we have conditioned on. For perfect
interleaving, exactly one of the m — 1 black crossings must fall into each
sector 1,2, • • • ,m — 1. Condition further on no crossings in sector and
sector m. Let p3 denote the probability that a voter point drawn from /
falls into sector 1 < j < m, conditioned on the event that it falls into
one of these sectors. Then ]T™ _1 Pj = 1, and the probability of perfect
interleaving is (m — 1)! n^Ll 1 /V By Jensen's inequality, this quantity is
maximized when pj = ~tY7, in which case it equals (77? — 1)!/(tt? — l)
m_1
~
y/2{m - l)7r((rr? - lj/e)™" 1/^ - \)m ~ l = e^2{m - l)7re-m .
By symmetry, this bound applies to each v
t
,i = l,...,2m. Multiplying
this bound by 2m yields the quantity (1) as claimed. For the corollary,
let Im be the indicator function that equals 1 if there is a majority rule
equilibrium and equals if there is not. Consider the infinite sum over m of
(1): it converges because of the negative exponential term. Therefore, with
probability 1, limsupm_+^ Im = 0, and the corollary follows.
For very small m the probability of nonempty core may be fairly large.
For instance the probability is 1 when there are two or four voters (m = 1,2).
So Theorem 1 may be counterintuitive to those familiar with the behavior
of small cases. But convergence is rapid. For 22 voters (77? = 11). the
probability bound given by (1) is less than 19c 1 . Informally, Theorem 1
states that "most" configurations have no core, once there are more than a
handful of voters.
Theorem 1 puts the 2-D case in accord, asymptotically, with the cases
in the literature. We may now address our main goal, which is to try to
resolve the conflict between the theoretical predictions and the empirical
observations.
1 Moreover, it is fairly easy to reduce the exponent on m in (1) from 3/2 to 1, and I
conjecture the true probability is at most 47r2 -2m .
3 Notation and Assumptions
We establish notation and introduce the main assumption of centeredness.
The voters form a set V C 9?m , where m > 2 is fixed. Each voter v G V is
independently identically distributed according to a probability distribution
For any hyperplane h G 3£m , we denote the two closed halfspaces defined
by h as h+ and /i~, respectively, where h~ contains the origin (if h contains
the origin the ambiguity won't matter). Let n = \V\ denote the number of
voters.
Definition: A probability distribution / is centered around iff for every
hyperplane h not passing through 0, the total mass of / in h+ is less than
1/2.
Definition: A probability distribution f(x) is centered around z iff f(x + z)
is centered around 0. If / is centered around z we say / is centered and z is
the center of f
.
Many common distributions are centered, for example the multinormal
(even with singular variance/covariance matrix), or the uniform distribution
on a parallelogram or ellipsoid. Most sign-invariant distributions are cen-
tered. Note our condition is that the population be drawn from a centered
distribution. This is a different and much weaker condition than requiring
that the population be centered. See [60] for additional explanation.
Koehler [27] gives some data for the U.S. Senate in 1985. A projection of
the 3 dimensional representation is shown in Figure 2. The overall shape is
quite interesting: there are two large opposing peaks, and a third, smaller,
central peak. On the basis of this data, the group's ideal points are quite
polarized and fail statistical fitness tests for both the normal and uniform
distribution classes. They also do not appear to be sampled from a concave
distribution. But they do appear roughly consistent with sampling from a
centered distribution. I do not know of any statistical tests for whether a
sample comes from a centered distribution, so I cannot support the preceding
statement rigorously. In section 6 some ideas for such statistical tests are
discussed, and some of the mathematical groundwork for these is laid here
(Corollary 6.2) and in [7, 60]. This area needs some more development.
In addition to the centeredness assumption, fi is taken to satisfy one (or
more) of the following technical regularity conditions: (i) fi has bounded
support; (ii)// is continuous; (iii)^ has positive continuous density in a ball
containing z. For empirical studies the first of these will ordinarily be sat-
isfied, since we usually take measurements on bounded scales. If we fit this
data to a normal or some other continuous distribution, then (ii) will apply.
Therefore, the regularity condition is fairly mild, though we do dispense with
it when possible (e.g. Theorem 7).
4 The instability of instability
In this section we introduce several plausible assumptions concerning indi-
vidual decision-making. Each leads to a modification of the Euclidean model.
Theorems 2-4 state that in any of these modified models, there is equilib-
rium with probability 1 as the population increases, when the population is
sampled from a centered distribution.
4.1 Model I: the 6-core
The first assumption we consider is that there exists some minimal "thresh-
old" value e > such that agents or voters will select a new alternative in
preference to the status quo or incumbent only if the new alternative is at
least e better.
Assumption I: faced with an "incumbent'* alternative a G 3ftm and another
alternative c £ 3?m , an agent with ideal point v € 3£m will prefer c only if
||o-r|| > || c -r|| + e.
We designate the Euclidean model, modified by Assumption I, as Model
I. It is worth noting that Assumption I is scale-independent, as will be the
other assumptions and Theorems 2-4. We rely implicitly on this invariance
later in this section, where we argue that assumption I will be justified in
a great many situations, including some where e may be hard or impossible
to measure. All that matters is that t be strictly positive. It should also
be pointed out that Assumption I says "only if". This permits nonunifor-
mity among the agents: each could have a different threshold, as long as no
threshold is less than t.
An undominated point in Model I can be viewed as an e-core point in
game-theoretic terminology.The e-core clearly is also similar to the notion of
an e-equilibrium.
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For e sufficiently large obviously the core will be nonempty. When fi is
centered, Theorem 2 says the core will become non-empty (w.p.l) as the
population increases, for any positive c, however small.
Theorem 2. Let // be a centered distribution on 9?m satisfying one of the
regularity conditions (i-iii). Let a population of n ideal points with Euclidean
preferences be sampled independently from fi. Then in Models I and II, for
any e > 0, there is equilibrium with respect to simple majority rule as n —
>
oo w.p.l.
Proof. While the actual proof of Theorem 2 is relegated to the appendix, the
intuitive ideas can be seen quite easily in two dimensions.
Consider Figure 3: for an alternative proposal |/ G 3? 2 , the shaded re-
gion defined by the hyperbola shown is where y will draw support against an
incumbent at the distribution center z. For any particular y, centeredness
implies that the probability measure of the associated hyperboloid region is
less than 1/2. Then by the law of large numbers, incumbent z will defeat c
with probability 1 as the population increases. To prove that all alternatives
are simultaneously defeated, we employ real analysis to control the probabil-
ity measures of all the hyperboloid regions with a single bound, and invoke
strong results on uniform convergence of empirical measures to be sure this
bound is adhered to closely enough in all the regions.
In the remainder of this section we will show that in the context of Model
I, the e-core has a strong foundation in economic and human behavior.
4.1.1 The cost of change
A very natural way to justify assumption I is to view e as the cost of change. 2
There can be very strong economic reasons for resisting change. For
example, when the U.S. Congress overhauled the tax law in 1986, the Wall
Street Journal reported an estimate of 100 billion dollars as the cost to Amer-
ican business for compliance, simply to meet the new legal, accounting, and
reporting requirements. Thus a change could easily decrease a company's
2 this observation, including the consequent conflict between empirical data and the
simple static form of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, is due to James
McConnell.
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applies to all voters. If a voter's computations are limited in this way, it
follows that the computations cannot be carried out to arbitrary precision,
since they are trivially limited by the number of states, M. If there is a
limit on precision, then for some e > (e.g. 2~2M if the input is binary),
the voter will not be able to distinguish between \\a — v\\ — \\c — v\\ < and
||a — u|| — \\c — v\\ < e. The exact value of e is not important here because of
the scale invariance of the results. Hence computational limitations have the
same effect on the Euclidean model as the cost of change, and thus provide
an alternate justification of Model I.
Several other formal models of computation lead to the same conclusion
as well. For example, suppose the computations are limited to a pushdown
automaton (PDA) with M or fewer states. The PDA is more powerful than
the DFA ([29]), so this is a less restrictive assumption. We claim the PDA
cannot compute the differences in distances to arbitrary precision, either.
We prove this claim as follows: if there existed a PDA that could compute
these differences, even in two dimensions, then for arbitrary (ai,o 2 )i ( l 'i 5 ^2):
{c-[ .c2 ) it could determine if (a^ — Vi) 2 + (a 2 — v2 )
2
— (cj — U1) 2 + (c2 — v2 )
2 <
0. Then under closure properties of the context-free languages (and their
equivalence to those accepted by PDAs), there would exist a PDA that could
recognize strings of form {(ir.x, y, z] :w 2 -\-x 2 =y 2 -\-z 2 ). But this contradicts
the pumping lemma for PDAs [29]. This establishes the claim. A slighly
less formal model would be. any automaton whose arithmetic operations are
performed in fixed precision. We have proved the following proposition:
Proposition: If each voter's computations can be performed on a PDA of at
most M states, or an automaton with fired precision arithmetic operations,
then Assumption I holds. 4
4We have a small philosophical problem here. The Von Neumann- Morgenstern theory
specifically does not assume that individuals calculate a utility function. Rather, it asserts
that (rational) individuals' decisions can be accurately modelled as though they did. But
in the bounded rationality justification of Model I, it seems we implicitly assume voters
do calculate their utility functions. Are we making an unrealistically strong assumption
about voter behavior?
This problem is resolved through the idea of computation as developed in complexity
theory. A person is faced with two alternatives, a and c. If she always decides in a manner
consistent with maximizing a utility function U(), then she always decides for c when
U(a) < U(c), and vice-versa. Thus she is, in effect computing the function AU(a,c) =
U(a) — U(c). More precisely, we could say that the voter receives input (a,c) and outputs
13
4.1.3 The cost of uncertainty
Assumption I will also be valid in many situations where there is a cost
of uncertainty. The uncertainty could be one of two kinds: it could be
uncertainty as to what the social decision outcome will be, or it could be an
uncertainty as to the consequences of a new alternative.
The first kind of uncertainty can have a large economic cost. For example
it is much easier to plan for hard times ahead if one knows whether the
problem will be inflation or recession. This is so obvious it seems unecessary
to justify — there is a vast literature on decision-making and planning under
uncertainty. If hedging cost nothing, uncertainty wouldn't cause problems.
But of course hedging is costly. In fact, planning under uncertainty is the
problem which gave rise to linear programming [9]. (This sounds similar to
the business cost of change. Here the point is the cost of hedging, such as
the cost of a flexible business plan, rather than cost of altering one's business
plans.)
The cost of uncertainty on the individual level is illustrated by many
psychological experiments in which subjects found the possibility of an un-
desireable outcome, more stressful than its certainty. One way to interpret
this is to assume that the voters or committee members attach a negative
utility to not reaching a conclusion. If this utility is at least t in absolute
value, then an individual would not propose a new alternative less than e
better than the incumbent proposal. This again leads to Model I.
Similarly, positive utility may often be associated with the group's reach-
ing a conclusion. For example, committee members may be permitted to
leave a smoke-filled room or go home and eat dinner, provided they reach a
conclusion. The purpose of the smoke is to increase the value of t in Model
I. The United States Congress always manages to resolve its knotty issues in
time for the members to spend Christmas with their families.
The second kind of uncertainty may cause voters to increase their prefer-
ence for an incumbent, because the incumbent is generally more of a known
"No" if and only if AU(a,c) < 0. In a formal sense, this input-output description is the
definition of computing whether AU < 0.
Therefore, we may say that the voter performs computations. We may not say that the
voter's computations are performed by some specific method. Nevertheless we can put
formal limits on the complexity of these computations by requiring that they could be
performed by a specific type of automaton. (This explains why AU was used in the proof
for PDAs, and why the wording of the Proposition is ". . . can be performed ...".)
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quantity ("better the devil you know,- • •" as the saying goes). This justifica-
tion would seem more likely to be valid in situations where the social choice
is a person, e.g. an elected official. It could also apply to situations where the
exact details of the new alternative are unspecified, and are to be worked out
later by a negocctiatingg committee or organization. In the United States,
the Congressional seniority system may increase preference for incumbents
in Senate and House elections. Suppose a voter is indifferent between the
incumbent's platform and a challenger's, and favorable overall towards both.
The voter may then prefer the incumbent, who by greater seniority would be
more effective.
4.2 Model II: minimal distance
Model II assumes there exists a threshold value e > such that proposals
are not distingished from one another unless they differ by e or more. We
define Model II precisely as:
Model II: There exists e > 0, such that any new proposal c offered to chal-
lenge the incumbent proposal a must satisfy \\a — c\\ > c.
In Model II the Euclidean model is altered by requiring the ''challenger"
proposal c to be at distance e or more from the incumbent a. The forbidden
points are those meeting Hotelling's principle of adjacency. Then a is an
equilibrium point if and only if no point c, \\c — a\\ > e is preferred to a by a
majority of the voters. The assumption of Model II is mathematically weaker
than Assumption I. Nonetheless. Theorem 2 assures eventual equilibrium
with probability 1 as the population grows.
Model II is partly motivated by situations where people cannot perceive
arbitrarily fine distinctions. More precisely, suppose there exists a perceptual
threshold value t > such that voters are unable to distinguish between pro-
posals that differ by less than e. Faced with two proposals sufficiently similar
to each other, voters will think the two proposals are the same. Therefore
any proposed alternative c would have to be at least c distant from the sta-
tus quo a. (Some evidence of perceptual threshold effects with respect to
economic quantities is found in [38]. Other examples of threshold effects are
found in [30].)
It is possible to justify Model II from a slightly different point of view.
Tullock [63] argues intuitively that the set of proposals that could get a ma-
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jority over the center would lie in a very small area, if voters were uniformly
distributed in a rectangle. He adds, "at this point, however, most voters will
feel that new proposals are splitting hairs, and the motion to adjourn will
carry." [pages 260-261]. Note that the uniform distribution on a rectangle is
centered. Therefore, as promised, one consequence of Theorem 2 is a math-
ematically rigorous justification of Tullock's "general irrelevance" argument.
Tullock's suggestion is not that participants will be unable to distinguish, but
that they will not tolerate arbitrarily fine distinctions or "hairsplitting". It
seems likely that this assumed limitation of hairsplitting will apply in many
situations, simply as a consequence of human behavior.
Model II is also applicable in situations where the institution explicitly
constrains new alternatives to be some minimal distance from the incumbent
proposal. In this context Model II represents one of the standard institutional
methods of restoring stability. Theorem 2 could therefore be employed as the-
oretical support for this institutional restriction. Theorem 3 and Model IV,
to follow, could be invoked to support another standard institutional restric-
tion (supermajority). This aspect of the results is not emphasized because
(in the author's opinion) the institutional approach has a more normative fla-
vor than the work here, where the goal is for stability to follow from natural,
plausible, widely applicable assumptions (rather than from easily enforced
rules).
4.3 Models III &: IV: incumbency advantages
The incumbent may enjoy particular advantages in attracting voters, espe-
cially in political situations where the incumbent is a person. In the United
States, incumbents generally have more visibility and campaign funding than
challengers. In many corporate elections the incumbent officers control the
proxy votes of inactive small shareholders. In general, there are apt to be
interests vested in the status quo, whether the status quo is a person, policy,
resource allocation, or law.
Models III and IV are intended to capture the "clout" or other advantage
the incumbent may possess. Model III states that the incumbent has an
advantage in drawing out supporters.
Model III: Supporters of the incumbent abstain with probability 1 — p > 0/
supporters of any challenger abstain with probability 1 — q > 1 — p.
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tens of dollars for breakpoints. No one ever suggests a tax rate of 21.462%
for taxable income over $34,601.13. Let Z denote the integers.
Model VI: Discretized Proposals For some v > 0, the set of feasible
proposals are the lattice points {vx : x G Zm }.
Theorem 4. Let // be a centered distribution satisfying one of the regularity
conditions (i-iii). Let a population of n ideal points be sampled indepen-
dently from fi. Then in Model V or VI, there is stability as n —> oo w.p.l.
Proof: Intuitively, Model V should resemble Model I, because any challenger
proposal must have utility at least one step higher to be preferred to the in-
cumbent. Model VI should resemble Model II, since both forbid challengers
to be arbitrarily close to the incumbent. The rigorous proofs are compli-
cated by the fact that the distributional center or its utility may not be at a
discretized value. Details are given in the appendix.
Modification VI and Theorem 4 also bear an interesting analogy with
the origins of quantum mechanics in Planck's investigation of black body
radiation [25. e.g.] 5
5 Classical theory at the turn of the century predicted a physically absurd behavior
of electromagnetic radiation from a black body: increasing intensity with increasing fre-
quency (decreasing wavelength). This meant an unbounded amount of total energy would
be emitted. These predictions were not in accord with observation for small wavelengths.
In analogy, classical spatial model theory predicts instability, in fact chaos, but these
predictions do not accord with observation.
In both cases, the reconciliation between theory and observation is probabilistic. That is,
there is no guarantee, just an overwhelming probability of agreement. In the case of black
body radiation, the small tail of the Boltzman distribution law ensures (probabilistically)
that high frequency oscillators will not be "triggered", because of the minimum excitation
any oscillator would require. In analogy. Modification VI and the small tail probabili-
ties given by uniform convergence ensure the nearby voters will not be "triggered'' into
favoring the challenger. In fact, from a statistical mechanics point of view, the "small
tails" have the same origin mathematically. It is interesting that, just as the quantum
assumption resolved other conflicts between theory and observation in physics, the "quan-
tum economics" resulting from discretization assumptions can help resolve other conflicts
in micro-economics. For example, experiments by Twersky and others have demonstrated
that people often do not distinguish between different small probabilities. A discretization
assumption on subjective probabilities would reconcile rational behavior with observation
in this case. Similarly, discretized utilities would rationalize cooperative (-equilibria in re-
peated prisoners' dilemma games. However, in this paper the main point is that a variety
of valid refinements all have the same effect.
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5 Trade-offs between centeredness and e
How realistic is the assumption, that fi is centered? While this remains an
open question for empirical study, it seems unlikely to me, a priori, that
ideal points are distributed as though sampled from a perfectly centered
distribution. The purpose of this section is to show how the stability results
of the previous sections carry over to the case where fi is not centered. The
main result is that there is a trade-off between the degree of centeredness and
the magnitude of t in the models. As a by-product of the proof, we establish
the consistency of the yolk radius, from a statistical estimation point of view.
In Theorems 2-4 of the previous section, the condition on fi is strong
(centeredness), while the modifying assumption is weak (e.g. e > 0). Perhaps
if // were almost centered, and t were not too small, then stability would ensue
with high probability.
To make this idea precise, we first need a way to measure how centered
or off-centered a distribution is. Two powerful concepts from the literature
present themselves: the radius of the yolk, and the min-max majority. The
yolk of a configuration of voter ideal points [20, 34] is defined as the smallest
ball intersecting all median hyperplanes (each closed halfspace contains at
least half the ideal points). The min-max majority [55, 28] is defined as the
smallest supermajority that permits some point to be undominated; a point
that is so undominated is a min-max winner.
Where V is a configuration of points, r(V) and c(V) will denote the radius
and center of the yolk of V, respectively. When V is clear from context we
will simply write r and c, respectively. Similarly, the min-max majority is
denoted ot*(V) and is always in the interval [1/2,1]. For any supermajority
level q, MQ {V) will denote the set of points that are undominated with
respect to a-majority rule. Thus Ma - is the set of min-max winners.
We extend the definitions of r, c, a", and M to distributions in the natural
way (see e.g. [7, 11, 60]). A median hyperplane h of a distribution // satisfies
fi{h+ ) > 1/2, fi(h~) > 1/2, and the yolk of //, with radius r(/i), is the smallest
ball intersecting all median hyperplanes. A point x is in MQ (/z) if and only
if, for every hyperplane h containing x, n{h + ) > 1 — a and fi{h~) > 1 — a.
Both r and a* are natural measures of centeredness. A distribution fi is
centered only if r(/j) = 0, and a*(//) = 1/2. (Iff moreover, e.g. when /z is
positive continuous.) As r increases from 0, or a" increases from 1/2, the
distribution becomes more off-centered.
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We wish to balance the off-centeredness of a distribution, as measured
by r or a", against the magnitude of the parameters in the modifications.
For finite fixed configurations, the following deterministic theorem gives a
trade-off between r and the e of Models I and II. If the cost of change or of
uncertainty exceeds the yolk radius, or the perceptual threshold is more than
twice the yolk radius, then stability exists.
Theorem 5: Suppose the yolk radius of a configuration V satisfies r(V) < e,
in Model I; or satisfies r(V) < e/2, in Model II. Then the yolk center is an
undominated point.
Proof: It suffices to consider the mathematically weaker case of Model II.
See Figure 4. For any proposal p at distance 2r from the yolk center c, the
bisecting hyperplane h of segment cp is either tangent to or outside the yolk.
Hence at least half the points are in the halfspace containing c, and c is
undominated.
The probabilistic counterpart to Theorem 5 holds, subject to the same
conditions as in Theorem 2. If the cost of change or uncertainty exceeds
the distributional yolk radius, then stability exists with probability 1 as the
population increases. Similarly, if the distributional yolk radius is smaller
than the finest precision of the available computation, or smaller than half
the perceptual threshold, then equilibrium exists w.p.l asymptotically.
Theorem 6: Let ^ be probability measure with distributional yolk radius
r(fi). and let // satisfy one of the regularity conditions (i-iii). Let a population
of n ideal points be sampled independently from u. Suppose Model I holds
with e > r(u), or Model II holds with t > 2r. Then there is stability as
n — oc w.p.l.
Proof: See appendix.
We wish to find a result similar to Theorem 6 that applies to Model
III. The Simpson-Cramer min-max majority is a natural counterbalance to
employ with Model III, since both are multiplicative effects on the voting
population. Suppose a < p/(p -f q), whence p(\ — a) > qa. The quantity
p{\ — a) is a lower bound on the expected fraction of the population which
votes for the incumbent; the quantity qa is an upper bound on the fraction
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voting for the challenger. Thus it is plausible that the incumbent would be
undominated. Theorem 7 makes this argument precise.
Theorem 7: Let n be a probability measure on 9£m . Suppose x £ MQ (fi).
Let a population of n ideal points be sampled independently from fi. Suppose
Model III holds and a < p/(p -f q). Then x will be an equilibrium point with
probability 1 as n — oo. (In particular, a* < p/{p-\-q) guarantees equilbrium
w.p.l as the population increases.)
Proof: see Appendix. This proof does not require any of the regularity
conditions (i-iii). E
6 Empirical issues
We began this study as an attempt to reconcile observations with the theoret-
ical predictions of the spatial model. We have argued for the plausibility and
broad justifiability of several slight modifications of the model, and proved
that any of these suffices to restore stability. This establishes the enriched
models as legitimate theories to explain observed stability. We now seek
stronger empirical validation of our models. Theorems 5 and 6 suggest one
kind of test: estimate for example the "cost of change," or precision level,
and the yolk radius, and check to see if stability was observed.
As stated in section 3, there are no statistical tests available (to the best
of my knowledge) to determine whether a sample derives from a centered dis-
tribution. These measures suggest the following kind of test: calculate the
sample r(/i n ) or a*(fi n ), and compare the value wTith or 1/2, respectively.
The comparison would have to take into account other parameters: n, the
sample size, and in the case of r some measure of distance (e.g. the mean dis-
tance between sample points) to make the test scale-invariant. Constructing
a good test may be difficult or not possible. In any case, a first step would be
to establish the consistency of the "estimators" r and a*. That is, we would
like to be sure that
lim r(fin ) -> r(n) a.s. (2)
n—>oo
and
lim a*(fin ) —> cx"(fi) a.s. (3)
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The latter convergence (3) has been established in [7] in the uniformly
continuous case and [60] in the general case. As a by-product of Theorem
6, Corollaries 6.1 and 6.2 following prove (2), though under more stringent
regularity conditions than I would like.
Corollary 6.1: Under the hypotheses of Theorem 6, limsupn r(//n ) <
r(fi), a.s.
Corollary 6.1 is one side of the convergence needed to establish the con-
sistency of the yolk radius statistic. Under additional conditions, the proof
also gives the liminf side of the convergence, which combines with 6.1 to give
consistency (2), stated next.
Corollary 6.2: Under the hypotheses of Theorem 6, and the additional
condition that // is continuous and strictly positive in the region of its support.
lim n r(// n ) = r((i), a.s.
The additional condition of Corollary 6.2 seems overly strong to me. On
the other hand, regularity condition (i) is not sufficient for the convergence
(2). A simple counterexample is two points, each with mass 1/2. A simple
two-dimensional counterexample is four points at the vertices of a rectangle,
each with probability 1/4. In this case we calculate liminfn r(// n ) = 1/(2 +
v2) < 1/2 = limsupn r(// n ). If the rectangle is made into a trapezoid, the
ratio between the limsup and the liminf can be made as large as desired.
A stronger test would be to check if the societal outcome falls within the
"solution set'
1
of the model. If a model passes this stronger test, then it
would appear to have good predictive power.
In the case of Model I, experimental work of Salant and Goodstein [49]
provides very promising test results. Salant and Goodstein conduct a se-
ries of experiments on committee voting under majority rule, and find that
the committees often choose alternatives other than the core (undominated
point), even when the core coincides with a unique Nash equilibrium in un-
dominated strategies. To reconcile the experimental results with the theory,
they modify the model by assuming that agents will only vote for a new
alternative if its utility exceeds the incumbent's by at least some nonzero
threshold amount. This is of course identical to Model I.6 With the e-core
solution concept Salant and Goodstein reconcile the outcomes of their ex-
6 Salant and Goodstein describe their threshold assumption (page 295) as a slight weak-
ening of the rationality hypothesis. As argued in 4.1.1, the threshold assumption can also
be viewed as perfectly rational in a great many situations, e.g. in the presence of a cost
of change, even if that cost be psychological, or the presence of a benefit to adjournment.
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periments. They also are able to explain the outcomes of the Fiorina and
Plott [22] and Eavey and Miller [15] experiments, which had previously been
regarded as structurally different [49, p. 296]. Salant and Goodstein report
plans to test the e-core solution concept in agricultural marketing and water
pollution management settings. It will be very interesting to observe the
outcomes of these and other such tests. It would also be interesting to have
similar tests on the other models proposed here.
There is considerable methodological work remaining, as well. Each solu-
tion concept brings with it the joint questions of computation and statistical
estimation. For the yolk, the algorithm of [61] handles the computational
question, and Theorem 6.1 in this paper makes a start at the estimation
question. For the Simpson- Cramer min-max set, [62] contains an efficient
computational method; as stated the asymptotic consistency is established
in [7, 60]. Similar work is called for with respect to the solution concepts of
Models I and II. In all these cases, more work remains on estimating variances
to incorporate into valid statistical tests and confidence intervals.
7 Extensions and related work
7.1 Technical extensions
We extend most of the results of the paper from Euclidean preferences to the
much more general class of intermediate preferences. This class, introduced
by Grandmont [23], is characterized by the "division by hyperplane prop-
erty": the bisecting hyperplane of segment ab separates the voters who prefer
a to b from those who prefer b to a. This class includes the C.E.S. (constant
elasticity of substitution) utility functions and is a tad more general than the
''linear preferences" of [6] (see this article for several nice illustrations of the
richness of this class).
All the definitions and models extend without change, except for Models
I and V. Model I is special because it is stated in terms of Euclidean distance
but Assumption I is about utilities. In the general case we now treat, utilities
and distance no longer correspond 7 . We define an extended model as follows,
where U[x] denotes the (static) utility of alternative x.
7Model I, unmodified, makes mathematical sense. But I don't think it is a meaningful
model when preferences are non-Euclidean.
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Model /': For some v > 0, agents will vote for an alternative c to incumbent
proposal a only if they determine that U[c] > U[a] + v.
Models /' and V implicitly assume individual preferences are representable
by a utility function. To extend the results to these models, we moreover
assume continuity of these utilities.
Assumption: Continuous Utilities: Each voter v has (static) preferences





Theorem 8 extends all the results in the paper to intermediate preferences,
except for Theorems 5 and 6 in the case of Model /'.
Theorem 8: Extend Models I' ,11-VI to intermediate -preferences. For Mod-
els I' and V, further assume Continuous Utilities. Then Theorems 1,2,3, 4, and
7 remain true. Theorems 5 and 6 remain true in the case of Model II.
Proof: The proofs of Theorems 1, 2 (Model II), 3, 4 (Model VI), 5 and 6
(Model II), and 7 all apply to the extended class without change. To prove
Theorem 2 for the case of Model /', let v > be given. By Continuous
Utilities at the origin, there exists e > such that
\\x\\ < e => \Uv [x} - Uv [0}\ < " VvCV. (4)
(We get uniform continuity for free since |V| is finite.)
Under the assumption of the model, no alternative with e of the origin
will be selected by any voter. Now we satisfy the condition of Model II, and
Theorem 2 for that case applies. The proof of Theorem 4 for the case of
Model V is supplemented in precisely the same way8 .
It would be interesting to further extend some of the results, particularly
Corollary 1, to even more general classes of preferences, e.g. the continuous
class treated in [48]. It is not clear how to formulate such a generalization in
a natural yet mathematically proper fashion.
We can weaken the assumption of Model I, to assume that only alterna-
tives at distance greater than e from the status quo are preferred only if they
are at least c closer to the ideal point. In this model, the proof of Theorem
6Theorems 5 and 6 do not work for Model V because the yolk radius needs to be
compared with the t of (4), which is a function of v, rather than with v itself. If we
strengthen the Continuous Utilities assumption to, say, uniformly Lipschitz continuous
with constant A', we easily get extensions of Theorems 5 and 6 to Model I where the yolk
radius is multiplied by K.
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2 carries through, under the stronger condition of fi spherically symmetric.
Perhaps a different method of proof would yield equilibrium under a weaker
condition.
7.2 Probabilistic considerations
There are many reasons to include a probabilistic element in a model of
social choice. These include variations in individual behavior, use of data
from a sample of the population (e.g. any survey or poll data), uncertainty
and inaccuracy of information. The models in this paper are probabilistic,
but are nonetheless wedded to the classic deterministic Euclidean spatial
model. The probabilistic element enters when V is sampled. Once V is
determined, what takes place is deterministic. Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
are really statements about the classic deterministic Euclidean model. Their
meaning is simply that most configurations in 2 dimensions, n even, have no
core (unless n is quite small). The statements sound probabilistic because
probability is the only language in which the phrase "most configurations"
can have a precise meaning (unlike "almost all" which could be phrased in
the language of analysis).
If we compare the models here with other more deeply probabilistic mod-
els, we find some very interesting differences and similarities. For purposes
of discussion, we consider a paper on spatial competition by De Palma et
g/.[13], and a related paper on spatial voting by Enelow and Hinich [16].
In [13] Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation is restored by intro-
ducing a "large enough" unobserved probabilistic heterogeneity in consumer
tastes; in [16] equilibrium is restored by introducing a "large enough" unob-
served probabilistic element to voter utility calculations (see also [17]). In
both cases, a competitive equilibrium between two location-seeking entities
(firms, candidates) is sought. This contrasts with the goal of a core point in
this work.
A more important contrast lies in how probability enters the model. In
both [16, 13] the Euclidean rule of selecting the alternative at least distance
is altered so that a consumer or voter selects between two alternatives with
probabilities weighted by a function of the distances. When the alternatives
are equidistant, the probabilities are equal; when the alternatives are almost
equidistant, the probabilities are almost equal. This modification eliminates
discontinuities in the gain (profit,votes) function [13, pages 771-772], and
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continuity is essential to the existence of a competitive equilibrium solution
to the positioning problem.
In contrast, the probabilistic element invoked here is not sufficient, by
itself, to reinstate stability. Indeed, for all of Models I-VI, if t = then there
is no stability a.e., as shown in the companion paper [60] (except the 2-D
n even case, where the instability is asymptotic). Moreover the instability
occurs precisely because of the discontinuity of the associated functional.
Also, the probabilistic assumptions of [13, 16] are ineluctably probabilis-
tic, because no single fixed configuration, in any number of additional di-
mensions, will deterministically provide the behavior of these models for all
pairs of locations chosen by the firms or candidates. Thus the product dif-
ferentiation in [13] is not due to a fixed though unknown set of additional
coordinates. Rather, the customer actions have inherent randomness in that
model.
Therefore the models we are comparing are not equivalent, and cannot
be made so. Note the results in this paper remain meaningful in the presence
of random behavior, because Theorems 2-4,6,7 actually construct a specific
point, prior to the sampling, which will be undominated a.s.
Despite the inherent differences in the models, there is an important qual-
itative similarity in the outcomes, that sufficiently large //,a 2
,
and e, respec-
tively, restore equilibrium. In particular, the a 2 value in [16] is intended
to capture some of the same effects as e here. The comparison suggests a
question: can the finite sample method be adapted to find a finite popula-
tion restoration of the principle of minimum differentiation? In the product
placement model, the firms will probably have a greater cost of change than
the consumers, because start-up production costs are typically very high.
This issue is also attractive because data on these costs should be readily
available; this would make empirical verification more practicable. It might
also be possible to apply the methods of this paper to the application areas
in [6, 5], distribution of income and equilibrium in markets with imperfect
competition.
7.3 dynamic considerations
Most of the considerations that lead to the models in this paper are con-
sequences of viewing the decision-making process as dynamic rather than
purely static. The models themselves are in part dynamic, in that they dis-
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tinguish between a status quo and a proposed alternative. A challenging
research goal would be an effective, fully dynamic model of social choice.
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9 Appendix: Proofs of stability theorems 2—
4, 6-7
The proofs all take the following form:
1. Define a class S of subsets sx {t) C 3£m , parameterized by e > and
x £ 3?m ,||x|| = 1. Members of the class may be halfspaces, for example.
To dislodge the incumbent, more than half the population sample must
fall into s x (e) for some x. Equivalently, the empirical measure fi n would
have to satisfy /i n (sx (e)) > 1/2 for some x.
2. Given arbitrary e > 0, show there exists 8 > such that for all x,
ti(sx{t))<ll2-6.
3. Verify properties of the class S to invoke convergence theorems of
stochastic processes and find that
sup \fi n (sx (e)) - fi{sx {e)\ -^ Oa.s.
X
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In particular, the greatest deviation of the empirical measure will even-
tually drop and stay below 8/2, with probability 1. Therefore, given
e > 0, there exists 6 > such that with probability 1,
Vx, iin{sm(e))<l/2-6/2<l/2
eventually as n —> oc. Combining this with step 1 implies that the
incumbent cannot be dislodged as n —* oo w.p.l.
The class S constructed in step 1 will vary depending on the modification
to the model.
We will repeatedly call on Lemmata 1 and 2, following, to accomplish
steps 2 and 3, respectively. One preliminary definition will be needed.
Definition. A probability measure fi on $m is r-centered at iff every
hyperplane h at distance > r from satisfies f*{h+ ) < 1/2. When r = the
distribution \i is centered. More generally r is the radius of a "distributional
yolk"
1
centered at 0[20, 59. 60].
Lemma 1. Let // be a measure on 3ftm , r-centered at 0. In addition let p.
satisfy any of the following conditions: // has bounded support; f.i is contin-
uous; // has continuous positive density in an open ball containing 5(0, r).
Then for all e > there exists S > such that all hyperplanes h at distance
r + e from satisfy //(/? + ) < 1/2-6.
Proof: If \x is continuous, then f.i{h^) is continuous in x. Since
sup fi{h£)= sup //(/£),
\\x\\>r+t \\x\\=r + c
and the second supremum is taken over a compact set, the supremum is at-
tained at some point x, where ||x|| = r-f e. By assumption of r-centeredness,
H(h^) < 1/2. Simply set 6 so that (i(h£) = 1/2 - 6. This establishes the
lemma for the continuous case.
If [i has bounded support, the idea is to build a polytope containing the
ball of radius r, so that each supporting hyperplane of the r + t ball lies
outside one of the supporting hyperplanes of the polytope, within the region
of support. See Figure 5 for a 2-dimensional illustration.
For the formal argument, let S(t) denote the sphere of radius t around
0. Let B be the bounded region of support, which we may take to be a ball
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around without loss of generality. As before, for any x 7^ let hx denote
the hyperplane containing x and normal to x. We say hyperplane h blocks
hyperplane k in B iff (h+ f)B) D (k+ C\B). In Figure 5, both hi and h 2 block
k in B.
Consider any x 6 S(r
-f e/2). Project x out to the point y = x(r +
e)/(r + c/2) on the sphere S(r
-f e). Obviously hx blocks /i y , regardless of
B. Moreover, since B is bounded (and e > 0), hx blocks h z for all z in a
neighborhood of y. Thus, for each x G 5(r + c/2) the hyperplane hx blocks
all h z for z in a corresponding open set in 5(r -f e). Trivially these open
sets cover S(r + e). By compactness of S(r 4- c), extract a finite subcover,
and recover the corresponding finite set of points X C S(r + e/2). The
hyperplanes defined by the points in X form the desired polytope.
Select x to maximize fi(h*), where the maximum is taken over all x G X.
We may do this since |A'| is finite. The rest is the same as the last sentence
of the proof for the continuous case.
In the last case, the open region between S(r) and S(r + t) has strictly
positive //-measure 8 for some 6 > 0. This completes the proof of Lemma
1.
We will use Lemma 1 in the case r = for step 2 and in the general case
for Theorem 6.
Lemma 2. The class of all closed halfspaces, open halfspaces, (closed) hyper-
boloids, closed balls, and pairwise unions, pairwise intersections and pairwise
set differences and complements of these, enjoy uniform convergence of the
empirical measure.
Proof: This follows from machinery in [41] for producing generalizations of
the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem. In particular, Lemma 18 (page 20) implies the
class of halfspaces and hyperboloids has polynomial discrimination; Lemma
15 (page 18) lets us augment this class with the complements, and ensuing
pairwise unions and intersections. Recall that /i n represents the empirical
measure, which places weight 1/n at each of the n sample points. That is,
let V = Vi, • ' • , vn denote the sample of n points taken independently from
fi. Then fin (T) = £?=! IVi€T/n.
Theorem 14 (page 18) then tells us that over this large class S the em-
pirical measure converges to the measure //:
sup|/i n (5) - n(S)\ -» a.s. (5)
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Now we prove Theorem 2, which states that in Models I and II, a cen-
tered distribution will have an undominated point with probability 1, as the
population grows.
Theorem 2: Let n voter ideal points be sampled independently from a
centered distribution // on 3ftm , satisfying one of the regularity conditions
(i-iii). Suppose simple majority rule is employed, with Euclidean preferences
and subject to Model I or II. Then with probability 1, as n —> oo, there is
an undominated point with respect to the sample configuration. (Moreover
the center of fi can be taken to be that point).
Proof: Let be the center of fj without loss of generality. We first consider
Model I. Let t > be given with respect to Model I. Voter v will select
y 6 3?
m
over incumbent iff ||r — y|| + e < ||u||. (Here | | indicates the
Euclidean norm.)
Accordingly let
sy (e) = {xe$lm :\\x-y\\ + e<\\x\\}
If a voter's ideal point is in s y (t), the voter will prefer y to the incumbent
0. Thus will be undominated if
fin (sy (e))< 1/2 Vi/€3r. (6)
That is, no alternate proposal y can muster 1/2 of the sample population's
support against 0. For any y ^ 0. let h y (c) denote the hyperplane normal
to y. passing through ey/||y|| (i.e., at distance e from 0). See Figure 3. The
hyperboloid s
y
(c) is necessarily contained in the halfspace h^(e). Hence,
sup ft n {s y {e)) < sup fi(h+{e)) (7)
Apply Lemma 1 with r = 0. So there exists S > such that
sup fi{h^(e))< 1/2 -6 (8)
y#o
The halfspaces h^(e) are contained in the class S of Lemma 2 By Lemma
2, as n —> oo, we have9
suP |/. n (/7 v
+ (6))- /i(/7 y
+ (e))|-0 a.s. (9)
Actually, Lemma 2 shows uniform convergence for the class sy (c) as well.
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In particular, consider the value 6/2 > 0. The convergence implies that
as n —* oo,
sup|/xn(/>+(e))-p(Aj(e))|<^ a.s. (10)
Substituting inequality (8) into (10) implies asn-> oo,
sup \/i n (h+(t))\ < 1/2 - 6/2 < 1/2, w.p.l,
y#o
which by inequalities (6) and (7) proves the theorem for Model I.
We now turn to Model II. For notational convenience, let 2e > denote
the threshold value of Model II. Hence \\y\\ > 2e. The voter v will prefer y iff
v is in the halfspace /i+(||?/||/2). This halfspace is contained in the halfspace
hy{(). Now we are in exactly the same situation as at inequality (7) in the
proof of Model I, which completes the proof.
The uniform convergence means we may take Q as the set of all infinite
sequences of points in 3?m
,
with measure derived from //.
Theorem 3: Let n voter ideal points be sampled independently from a cen-
tered distribution fi on 3R
m
. Suppose simple majority rule is employed, with
Euclidean preferences modified as in Model III or IV. Then with probability
1, as n — oo, there is an undominated point with respect to the sample
configuration.
Proof: Consider the class C of halfspaces Kq (x) generated by hyperplanes
h(x) through 0, normal to x £ 9?m . Since Cc5, Lemma 2 implies that
suV \^ n (h
+ (x))\<l/2
x
(This is closely related to the convergence of an a-majority victor as shown
in [7, 60]).
For any 6 > 0, the incumbent will be preferred by at least (1/2 — S)n
members of the population, in the limit w.p.l. Let q > p from Model III be
given. Select positive 6 < (q — p)/[4 - 2(p + <?)]. According to Model III, the
incumbent will receive at least ~ (1 — p)(l/2 — S)n votes; the challenger will
receive no more than ~ (1 — q)(l/2 + 6)n votes. (Here we are implicitly relying
on the exponentially small tails of the binomial distribution to substitute the
expected number of non-abstaining votes for the random number who will
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actually vote. — see the proof of Theorem 7 for details.) Algebra shows that
(1 — p)(l/2 — 6) > (1 — <7)(l/2 -f 6). Therefore the incumbent receives more
votes than the challenger. This establishes equilibrium under Model III.
Similarly, under Model IV, with probability 1 nearly 1/2 the voters pre-
fer the incumbent, and the extra Q(n) support is enough to maintain in
equilibrium. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
An additional nondegeneracy assumption is required for the proof of The-
orem 4. The assumption amounts to the requirement that the location or
utility of the center of the distribution does not fall at an exact midpoint
between two allowable discrete values. This condition holds with probability
1 if the center of the distribution is independent of the base value of the
discretization. Thus it is an exceedingly mild assumption which however we
make explicit for the sake of mathematical rigour.
Nondegenerate Normalization Condition. Let c be the center of the
distribution //. For Model V: the utility functions Uv of the voters v are
normalized at c such that Uv {c)/u - [Uv(c)/u\ = r\ ^ 1/2. For Model VI:
the coordinates of the center satisfy c
x
jv — [ci/u\ ^ 1/2, i = 1, • • • ,m.
Theorem 4: Let r? voter ideal points be sampled independently from a
centered distribution /i on 3J rr', satisfying one of the regularity conditions
(i-iii). Suppose simple majority rule is employed, with Euclidean preferences
and subject to Model V (resp. VI) and the corresponding nondegenerate
normalization condition. Then with probability 1, as n —*• oo, there is an
undominated point with respect to the sample configuration.
Proof (Model V): To start we make the discretized utility function precise.
Let the utility function and its discretization be denoted U and DU
,
respec-
tively. Let DU be found by rounding. Thus if U[a] = wu (w not necessarily
integer), then DU[a] = \w + l/2\u.
Let the center of the distribution be c. Now let t = DU[c]-\-v/2— U[c). The
nondegenerate normalization condition guarantees t > 0. This transforms
the situation into an equivalence with Model I, and the rest follows from
Theorem 2.
Proof (Model VI): This case is not immediately equivalent to Model II be-
cause we cannot know that the distribution center c is a member of the lattice
of admissable proposals. In other words, once we assume is an admissable
proposal, we cannot assume is the distribution center without loss of gen-
32
erality. It will be more convenient in the proof to do the converse: we take
c = without loss of generality, and shift the lattice instead. Formally, let
the lattice of admissable proposals be denoted £ = {/? + vx : iE Zn ). Here
P is some fixed point in $t
m
.
Each coordinate value of (3 can be taken to be in the interval [0, v),
since adding integer multiples of v does not affect the definition of C. The
nondegenerate normalization condition ensures in addition that /?, 7^ 1/2 Vz.
Define c, the discretized center of /z, as
Ci = Pi if ft < i//2
Pi - v if Pi > i//2
See Figure 6 for an illustration.
Our goal now is to show that the discretized center c is undominated.
For any other lattice point y E £, y ^ c, let hy (c) denote the hyperplane
bisecting the segment yc (normal to y — c, passing through (y -f c)/2). Of
the two halfspaces defined by h y (c), let h^(c) denote the one containing y.
By the triangle inequality, c = is closer to c than to y. So ^ h+(c). Let
t > equal the minimum distance from to h
y
(c), over all y 6 £, y 7^ c.
This minimum exists because it is attained at some y : \y,\ < 2v.
If c is the incumbent proposal, each feasible alternative proposal receives
support from voters in a halfspace at least t from 0, the true center of the
distribution //. This situation is identical to that of Model II, and the rest
follows from Theorem 2. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 6: Take the yolk center c = without loss of generality. Let
A = (e-r)/2 (respectively (c/2-r)/2 for the case of Model II.) Given A > 0,
apply Lemma 1 to find S > such that all hyperplanes at distance r + A
from satisfy fi{h + ) < 1/2 - 6. Note r + A < e (respectively r + A < e/2).
By Lemma 2, w.p.l for all these hyperplanes fin (h + ) < 1/2 — 6/2 even-
tually as n increases. Then all median hyperplanes of the empirical measure
(i.e. the finite sample configuration) are at distance less than 1 (resp. e/2)
from 0. Apply Theorem 5 to complete the proof.
As a consequence of the proof, a ball of radius e centered at would
intersect all median hyperplanes. This implies that eventually, the sample
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yolk radius will satisfy r(/in ) < e. Since this is true for all e > r(/i), we
conclude that limsup
n_ 00 r(/z n ) < r(/z) a.s.
Now we make the additional assumption of Corollary 6.2, that \i is posi-
tive and strictly continuous in its region of support. Then for any S > 0, there
exists A > 1/2 such that all the hyperplanes h at distance r(/z)-f 6 from have
mass at least A in the closed halfspace they define, i.e. p-{h~) > A > 1/2.
So by the same argument as above, we conclude that liminfn^oo r(^ n ) >
r(p) a.s. This inequality combined with Corollary 6.1 proves Corollary 6.2.
Theorem 7: Let p be a probability measure on $t.m . Suppose x £ MQ (p).
Let a population of n ideal points be sampled independently from p.. Suppose
Model III holds and o. < p/(p + q). Then x will be an equilibrium point with
probability 1 as n —* oo.
Proof of Theorem 7: To start we simply count supporters, ignoring the issue
of abstention. By the convergence of the min-max majority [7, Theorem
3](continuous case), [CO, Theorem 6](general case), (this also follows easily
from Lemma 2), x £ Ma (f.t) implies that w.p.l, the fraction of population x
will muster against all alternatives converges to 1 — a or more. This does not
mean that x will have the support of precisely ?i(l — a) or more voters (i.e.
that x will be an Q-majority winner, see [60]). But it does mean that for any
(5>0,iG MQ+ s{p n ) eventually as 7i —» oo w.p.l. That is, eventually x will
be a (q + <5)-majority winner, in the sample configuration, w.p.l.
In the preceding paragraph, we were counting supporters rather than
votes. Now we take absentions into account. Fix S > with a value to be
determined later. Assume all statements in this paragraph are modified by
the phrase "eventually as n —> oo, with probability 1." The incumbent x
gets at least n(\ — o. — 8) supporters. Therefore x receives a number of votes
(stochastically) greater than or equal to a random variable A' distributed
according to a binomial distribution B[n(\ —a — 6),p\ (success probability p,
with n(l — a — 6) trials.) Out of the n members of the population c gets at
most n(a + <5) supporters, and receives votes stochastically less than random
variable C distributed as B[n(a + 8),q].
Our hypothesis is (1 — a)p > qa. Hence there exists 6 > such that
(1 — q — S)p > q(a + S). This determines 6 > as promised. We now
have two binomially distributed variables, X and C, with expected difference
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proportional to n, namely:
[(I — a — S)p — (a + <$)<?] n.
By the Chernoff bounds [58] or other bounds on tail probabilities of the
binomial distribution [19], the value of X will exceed the value of C almost
surely as n —* oo. This completes the proof of Theorem 7.
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